Japan

Embargo - On the 23rd of june 1941, United States Interior Secretary Harold Ickes wrote in a memo to Roosevelt: ''there will never be so good a time to stop the shipment of oil to Japan as we now have. There might develop from the barging of oil to Japan such a situation as would make it not only possible but easy to get into this war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be brought in, we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of communist Russia.'' 

Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the US and later forced an oil embargo on Japan in an international act of hostility. As a direct result, Japan now lost access to 75% of her overseas trade and 88% of her imported oil.

War Secretary Henry Stimson phrased it in his diary: "We face the delicate question of the diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure that Japan is put into the wrong and makes the first bad move, overt move. The question was how we should maneuver the Japanese into the position of firing the first shot." 

The major organization which propagated up public support for US involvement in the European war before Pearl Harbor attack was the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. At the end of 1940, West Virginia Senator Rush D. Holt issued a detailed examination of the committee: ''The committee has powerful connections with banks, insurance companies, financial investing firms, in industrial concerns. These in turn exert influence on college presidents and professors, as well as on newspapers, radio, and other means of communication. If the committee succeeded in getting the U.S. into war, Holt warned, American boys will spill their blood for profiteers, politicians, and patriots. If war comes on the hands of the sponsors of the white committee, will be blood, the blood of Americans killed in a needless war.'' 

In March 1941, a list of most of the committee's financial backers was made public. It revealed the forces eager to bring America into the European war. Powerful international banking interests were well represented. 

In his diary entry of the 1st of May 1941, Charles A. Lindbergh, the American heroic aviator and peace leader, exposed the coalition that was pushing the United States into the war: "The pressure for war is high and mounting. The people are opposed to it, but the administration seems to have the bit in its teeth and is hell-bent on its way to war. Most of the Jewish interests in the country are behind war and they control a huge part of our press and radio and most of our motion pictures.'' 

General Eisenhower's brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower said: "President Roosevelt found it necessary to get the country into World War II to save his social policies.''

Foreknowlege of Pearl Harbor - There is evidence that the attacks on the U.S. military base in Pearl Harbor in Hawaii were a successful false flag attack. However, in this example, rather than the U.S. government staging an attack and blaming it on an enemy, the U.S. government is accused of knowing of the attack and allowing it to happen so they could take advantage of the ensuing fear experienced by Americans.

Early in 1941, Congressman Martin Diaz's committee came into possession of a strategic map which gave clear proof of the intentions of the Japanese to make an assault on Pearl Harbor. The strategic map was prepared by the Japanese Imperial Military Intelligence Department. Martin wrote: "As soon as I received the document, I telephoned Secretary of State Cordell Holt and told him what I had. Secretary Holt directed me not to let anyone know about the map and stated that he would call me as soon as he talked to President Roosevelt. In about an hour, he telephoned to say that he had talked to Roosevelt and they agreed that it would be very serious if any information concerning this map reached the news services. I told him it was a great responsibility to withhold such vital information from the public. The Secretary assured me that he and Roosevelt considered it essential to national defense.''

General Elliot R. Thorpes served as a military attache in Dutch-controlled Java, Netherlands Indies. In 1941, when the Dutch broke a Japanese diplomatic code, the intercepted message referred to planned Japanese attacks on Hawaii, the Philippines, and Thailand. He immediately cabled the information to Washington and promptly delivered copies of the decoded text to including President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall, and the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark. Copies also went to Harry Hopkins, FDR's communist advisor. Because the US and Britain now had cracked Japan's naval communication codes, all important Japanese codes were broken. Roosevelt knew about the coming surprise attack, but no warning was sent to the commanders at Pearl Harbor. Naval intelligence intercepted and translated numerous Japanese naval dispatches, some clearly revealing that Pearl Harbor had been targeted. If a break in the US relations was forecoming, Tokyo would issue a special radio warning. The message to be repeated three times during a weather report was "Higashi no kaze ame" - "East Wind, Rain". "East Wind" signified the United States. "Rain" signified diplomatic split, a war. This prospective message was deemed so significant that US radio monitors was constantly watching for it and the Navy Department typed it up on special reminder cards. On December 4th, "Hikashi no Kaze Ame" was broadcast and picked up by Washington Intelligence. While issuing the final provocations of Japan, FDR and his military chairman George Marshall set the bait for the Japanese fish to bite.

The Japanese, in the hopes of gaining an early advantage, decided to impose as much danger to the US Navy as possible. On the morning of 7th of December 1941, Japanese planes, launched from aircraft carriers, attacked the American fleet at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. sinking or heavily damaging 18 ships, including 8 battleships, destroying 188 planes. The attack on Pearl Harbor ignited a sudden press frenzy and a wave of patriotic enthusiasm for entering the war. Roosevelt and the people around him would finally have their world war. The attack was not a surprise. Roosevelt deliberately allowed 2,400 US sailors to die without any warning. From the diary of Henry Stimson, we can see that Stimson's immediate feeling was not one of sorrow or outrage over the lost lives at Pearl Harbor, but rather of relief: "When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of relief that a crisis had come.''

Oliver Littleton, wartime British production manager, was undeniably correct when he declared: "It is a travesty on history ever to say that the United States was forced into the war. America provoked the Japanese to such an extent that they were forced to attack."

Fire bombing - In April and May 1945, Japan made three attempts through neutral Sweden and Portugal to bring a peaceful end to the war. In August, Japan tried via neutral Soviet channels to negotiate surrender. every peace attempt made by Japan would also be fruitless. Ignoring the Japanese pleads for peace, the Allies would instead prepare for major attacks on Japan. US planners analyzed weather and seasonal winds to optimize the technical success of large-scale incendiary and atomic weapon operations, recognizing that high winds would cause firestorms in heavily populated urban areas. This was especially devistating, as most homes were made out of wood and paper, and that the pilots had been ordered to fly as low as possible. Tokyo, alone had suffered the single deadliest bombing raid in all of human history, killing 100,000 people. 80,000 to 100,000 Japanese civilians were killed in a single night during the Firebombing of Tokyo (Operation Meetinghouse). Across the entire systematic firebombing campaign targeting more than 60 Japanese urban areas, total civilian deaths are estimated to exceed 300,000

After the war, General Curtis LeMay, who directed the campaigns remarked: "I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal."

Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Anola Gay co-pilot, Robert Lew: ''My god, what have we done?''

The combined death toll beterrn Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been estimated to be upwards of 300,000 people, virtually all of them civilians. 30 to 60 minutes later, a heavy, tar-like, radioactive precipitation known as black rain formed when intense firestorm soot mixed with radioactive fallout and atmospheric moisture, contaminating water sources and causing severe internal and external radiation poisoning.

Of the eight five-star generals and admirals during World War II, seven believed that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were ultimately unnecessary. 

Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight Eisenhauer: ''The Japanese were ready to surrender, and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing.''

Fleet Admiral, Chester Nimits: ''The atomic bomb played no decisive part from a purely military point of view in the defeat of Japan. The use of atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender.''

Fleet Admiral Ernest King: ''I didn't like the atom bomb or any part of it. An effective naval blockade would, in the course of time, have starved the Japanese into submission through lack of oil, rice, medicines, and other essential materials.''

Fleet Admiral William Halsey Jr.: ''The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. It was a mistake to ever drop it. They had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before.''

Fleet Admiral William Leahy: ''It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effect of sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.''

General of the Army & Air Force Henry H. Arnold: ''It always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse.''

In 1945, former President Herbert Hoover sent a memo to President Harry Truman, urging him to change the surrender terms to allow Japan to keep their emperor, the one condition keeping them from surrendering. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, having read the memo, called it: "a wise, statesmanlike document... [and] had it been put into effect, would have obviated the slaughter at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in addition to much of the destruction of the island of Honshu by our bomber attacks. That the Japanese would have accepted it and gladly, I have no doubt.'' 

The president's highest ranking and closest military advisers came to this conclusion from, among other things, the absolute devastation inflicted on Japan by early 1945. Tokyo, for example, had suffered the single deadliest bombing raid in all of human history, killing 100,000 people. Aside from Tokyo, cities across the country were being destroyed.

In May of 1945, Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew became a strong advocate of relaying to the Japanese that they would be able to keep their emperor if they surrendered. Grew met with the president to convince him to change the surrender terms. Truman told him to convene a meeting with the chiefs of staff and the secretaries of the war and navy. The meeting was held on May 29th. Afterward, Grew wrote in a memorandum of the meeting: ''The meeting lasted for an hour, and in the course of the discussion, it became clear that Mr. Stimson, Mr. Forrestal, and General Marshall were all in accord with the principle, but for certain military reasons, not divulged, it was considered inadvisable for the President to make such a statement just now.'' In his memoir, Grew wrote that after the meeting: "I duly reported this to the President, and the proposal for action was, for the time being, dropped." Secretary of War Henry Stimson would write in his diary what was really going on. "It was an awkward meeting because there were people present in the presence of whom I could not discuss the real feature which would govern the whole situation, namely S-1. (codename for the atomic bomb) In his autobiography, co-authored with McGeorge Bundy, Stimson declared: "It is possible, in the light of the final surrender, that a clearer and earlier exposition of American willingness to retain the Emperor would have produced an earlier ending to the war. This course was earnestly advocated by Grew and his immediate associates during May 1945.'' The United States, by its delay in stating its position, had prolonged the war. By July, the situation was so dire in Japan, Stimson wrote the president in a top-secret memo: "We have the following enormously favorable factors on our side, factors much weightier than those we had against Germany. Japan has no allies. Her navy is nearly destroyed. She is terribly vulnerable to our concentrated air attacks upon her crowded cities, industrial and food resources. She has against her not only the Anglo-American forces, but the rising forces of China and the ominous threat of Russia. I believe Japan is susceptible to reason in such a crisis to a much greater extent than is indicated by our current press and other current comment. Japan is not a nation composed wholly of mad fanatics of an entirely different mentality from ours. On the contrary, she has within the past century shown herself to possess extremely intelligent people. She has not only built up powerful armies and navies, she has maintained an honest and effective national finance and respected position in many of the sciences in which we pride ourselves. I think the Japanese nation has the mental intelligence to recognize the folly of a fight to the finish.'' 

June 30th, 1945, War Department report: "Short of nuclear war, the entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat." According to a report from the Joint Chiefs as early as April: "Once convinced of the inevitability of defeat, it is possible that a government could be formed that would sign and could enforce a surrender instrument."

Truman again took to his diary, this time recounting his meeting with Winston Churchill. Stalin had told PM of telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace. Stalin also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in. I am sure they will when Manhattan appears over their homeland. Indeed, Truman had been able to read encrypted Japanese telegrams as a result of the "Magic'' Intercept program. The Emperor's desire for peace had been on display for the Americans, since the diplomatic cables written and received by his foreign minister were decrypted. Japan sought the Soviet Union to negotiate peace, in vain, as the Soviets chose to string them along. Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo had relayed to his ambassador to Moscow: "The substance of the following should be borne in mind as appropriate in your direct explanation to Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. It is His Majesty's heart's desire to see the swift termination of the war.'' 

The Potsdam Conference culminated in the Potsdam Declaration, an ultimatum to the Japanese that if they did not proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, they would face prompt and utter destruction. Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew again tried his hand at maneuvering the language to include retention of the Emperor, and even got a sentence included in a draft of the Declaration in Article 12, which said that surrender may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty. By the time the Japanese government received the Declaration on July 27th, this sentence had been deleted. Pursuant to this language, or lack thereof regarding the status of the Emperor, the Japanese announced publicly that they would ignore the declaration. 

Unfortunately for the Japanese, it appears from the historical record that they were party to a war plan that was predetermined. Writing candidly in his 1952 memoir, Harry Truman divulged: "Anxious as we were to have Russia in the war against Japan, the experience at Potsdam now made me determined that I would not allow the Russians any part in the control of Japan. As I reflected on the situation during my trip home, I made up my mind that General MacArthur would be given complete command and control after victory in Japan. We were not going to be disturbed by Russian tactics in the Pacific. Force is the only thing the Russians understand. And while I was hopeful that Russia might someday be persuaded to work in cooperation for peace, I knew that the Russians should not be allowed to get into any control of Japan.'' 

Secretary of War, Henry Simson: ''At no time from 1941 to 1945 did I ever hear it suggested by the president or by any other responsible member of the government that atomic energy should not be used in the war. 

Truman: ''Let there be no mistake about it, I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used.'' Indeed, Harry Truman was convinced that the bomb should be used even before the Potsdam Conference, as confirmed by his Secretary of State Joseph Burns, who stated in an interview: "...neither the President nor I were anxious to have them enter the war after we had learned of this successful test."

Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew: ''I and a good many others will always feel that had the president issued as far back as May 1945 the recommended categorical statement that the Japanese dynasty would be retained if the Japanese people freely desired its retention, the atom bomb might never have had to be used at all.'' 

Strategic bombing survey - That the Japanese were on the verge of surrender was supported by a survey conducted by the War Department, embarked on by over 1,000 staff members who interviewed hundreds of Japanese military officers, officials, politicians, and the like. Published in 1946, it would be titled The Strategic Bombing Survey. In their conclusion read the following: ''Based on a detailed investigation of all of the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the survey's opinion that certainly prior to December 31st, 1945, and in all probability prior to November 1st, 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, Even if Russia had not entered the war and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.''

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By: GDF, Tobias Bratt

Raped by: Otto Heckel